The Applicability of Section 2462\u27s Statute of Limitations to SEC Enforcement Suits in Light of the Remedies Act of 1990 by Maxson, Catherine E.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 94 Issue 2 
1995 
The Applicability of Section 2462's Statute of Limitations to SEC 
Enforcement Suits in Light of the Remedies Act of 1990 
Catherine E. Maxson 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Legislation Commons, and the Securities Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Catherine E. Maxson, The Applicability of Section 2462's Statute of Limitations to SEC Enforcement Suits 
in Light of the Remedies Act of 1990, 94 MICH. L. REV. 512 (1995). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol94/iss2/9 
 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
The Applicability of Section 2462's Statute of Limitations to 
SEC Enforcement Suits in Light of the Remedies Act of 
1990 
Catherine E. Maxson 
INTRODUCTION 
Since Roman times, legal systems have imposed time restric-
tions on the ability of plaintiffs to sue.1 Traditional justifications for 
these statutes of limitations include providing a release for defend-
ants from old liabilities, encouraging plaintiffs to bring cases while 
the evidence is still obtainable and the witnesses' memories fresh, 
and giving property owners security in their rights.2 Despite these 
benefits, the common law courts have long exempted government-
initiated suits from time restrictions in the absence of specific legis-
lative authorization for imposing such time bars.3 This exemption 
for the government developed in England to protect the preroga-
tive of the sovereign.4 The practice took root in the United States, 
despite the absence of a sovereign, because of a desire to preserve 
the government's right to revenues and to ensure the enforcement 
of public policy.5 In order for this exemption to apply, however, the 
state must sue in its governmental capacity, meaning that it is pri-
marily acting to protect the public's rights rather than its own 
interests.6 
1. See Note, Developments in the Law: Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 
1177 (1950). 
2. See Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 114-15 (1970); S. REP. No. 1328, 89th Cong., 
2d Sess. 2 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2502, 2503-04; Developments in the Law: 
Statutes of Limitations, supra note 1, at 1185-86. 
3. This principle is embodied in the maxim nullum tempis occurrit regi - time does not 
run against the king. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 132 (1938); 
United States v. Thompson, 98 U.S. 486, 489 (1879); Dole v. Local 427, Intl. Union of Elec., 
Radio & Mach. Workers, 894 F.2d 607, 610 (3d Cir. 1990); Glenn Elec. Co. v. Donovan, 755 
F.2d 1028, 1033 (3d Cir. 1985); United States v. Central Soya, Inc., 697 F.2d 165, 166 (7th Cir. 
1982); SEC v. Lorin, 869 F. Supp. 1117, 1127 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); SEC v. Toomey, 866 F. Supp. 
719, 724 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). 
4. See ROBERT DORSEY WATKINS, THE STATE AS A PARTY LmoANT 33 (1927); Note, 
State's Immunity to the Statute of Limitations, 38 Iu .. L. REV. 418, 419 (1944). 
5. See Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273, 290 (1983); Guaranty Trust Co., 304 U.S. at 
132; Dole, 894 F.2d at 610 & n.6. 
6. See E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. Davis, 264 U.S. 456, 462 (1924); Dole, 894 F.2d 
at 611-12; WATKINS, supra note 4, at 63. To illustrate the distinction, the state acts in its 
governmental capacity when it prosecutes violators of statutes because such suits benefit the 
general public. Suits by the government to enforce a contract with one of its suppliers, on the 
other hand, would not receive immunity from statutes of limitations because such actions 
only directly affect the rights of the state as a contractual party. In such suits, the government 
resembles a private litigant. 
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Because the government's immunity from statutes of limitations 
conflicts with the policy behind having such provisions, Congress 
has created time bars that explicitly override the exemption. Many 
federal regulatory schemes include their own statutes of limitations 
applicable to certain actions brought under their authority.7 Addi-
tionally, three general statutes of limitations found in title 28 of the 
United States Code restrict civil suits by the government. One such 
time bar, section 2462, governs suits to impose any civil fines, penal-
ties, or forfeitures that are authorized by federal statute.8 Another, 
section 2415, controls federal government actions for damages 
based in contract or tort law.9 In 1990, Congress added a third gen-
eral statute of limitations to title 28 applicable to all civil suits based 
on federal laws enacted after December 1, 1990.10 
Despite the existence of the general statutes of limitations in 
title 28, many government suits remain unrestricted by any time 
Dole demonstrates the difference between private and public litigants. In Dole, the gov-
ernment sought an injunction to force a union to allow one of its members to examine collec-
tive bargaining agreements made with various employers. Although the employee would 
benefit if the government succeeded in obtaining the injunction, the court rejected the asser-
tion that the Secretary of Labor was suing to serve private interests rather than the public. 
894 F.2d at 611-12. "[T]he touchstone remains the fact that public policies are served and the 
public interest is advanced by the litigation, and the fact that the litigation has private benefi-
ciaries as well does not detract from the public nature of the suit." 894 F.2d at 612. 
The public-private distinction is important because private litigants generally borrow a 
limitations period from state law when the federal statute creating the cause of action does 
not contain such a restriction. See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 
501 U.S. 350, 355 (1991). When suing on behalf of public rights, the government is exempt 
from this borrowing requirement. See 501 U.S. at 355-56; Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 
432 U.S. 355, 367 (1977); United States v. Summerlin, 310 U.S. 414, 416 (1940); Dole, 894 
F.2d at 610. 
7. For example, § lO(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1988), 
contains a six-month limitations period, and the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) contains its 
own statutes of limitations, such as that found at 26 U.S.C. §§ 6501-03 (1988). 
8. See Judicial Improvements Act of 1948, ch. 646, Pub. L. No. 80-773, 62 Stat. 974 ( codi-
fied at 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (1988)). 
9. See Act of July 18, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-505, § 1, 80 Stat. 304 (1966) (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2415 (1988)). Section 2415 applies to a variety of suits brought by 
the government in addition to suits based in tort and contract law, such as actions for conver-
sion of U.S. property. 
This Note does not devote further attention to§ 2415 because it does not control prosecu-
tions by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Section 2415 only applies to suits 
by the federal government seeking money damages. In the securities laws, only private plain-
tiffs can request damages. See 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1988). The cinly case addressing the applica-
bility of § 2415 to SEC suits based its dismissal of the statutes of limitations defense on 
grounds that the SEC did not request damages as a remedy. See SEC v. Rind, 991 F.2d 1486, 
1492-93 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 439 (1993). 
10. See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 313(a), 104 Stat. 5114 
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1658 (Supp. II 1990)). Section 1658 states: "Except as 
otherwise provided by law, a civil action arising under an Act of Congress enacted after [Dec. 
1, 1990] ..• may not be commenced later than four years after the cause of action accrues." 
28 U.S.C. § 1658 (Supp. II 1990). Because the relevant sections of the securities laws were all 
passed prior to December 1, 1990, this section does not affect SEC enforcement actions, thus 
placing analysis of § 1658 outside the scope of this Note. 
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bar.11 Notably, courts have never dismissed an action by the Secur-
ities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for violating a statute of lim-
itations12 not contained within the securities laws themselves.13 
Courts have decided not to apply either section 2462 or section 
2415 of title 28 because the equitable forms of relief traditionally 
available to the SEC in enforcement suits14 places these suits 
outside the reach of these statutes.1s To bolster their decisions 
11. See, e.g., Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355 (1977) (holding that no time 
bar controls government suits under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Capozzi v. 
United States, 980 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding the same in the context of ex parte Inter-
nal Revenue Service (IRS) proceedings); Mullikin v. United States, 952 F.2d 920 (6th Cir. 
1991) (same); Dole v. Local 427, Intl. Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers, 894 F.2d 607 
(1990) (holding the same in a case under §§ 104 and 210 of the Labor-Management Report· 
ing and Disclosure Act); see also Rind, 991 F.2d at 1490 (listing other cases in which the 
courts found no statute of limitations applicable to the federal government). 
12. See Rind, 991F.2d1486; SEC v. Lorin, 869 F. Supp. 1117 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); SEC v. 
Toomey, 866 F. Supp. 719 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); SEC v. Egan, 821 F. Supp. 1274 (N.D. Ill. 1992); 
SEC v. O'Hagan, 793 F. Supp. 218 (D. Minn. 1992); SEC v. Keating, 1992 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) 'lI 96,906 (C.D. Cal. July 23, 1992); SEC v. Willis, 777 F. Supp. 1165 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); 
SEC v. Hayes, 1991 Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH) 'l[ 96,236 (N.D. Tex. July 25, 1991); SEC v. 
Washington County Util. Dist., 1982 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'l[ 99,112 (E.D. Tenn. Dec. 2, 
1982); SEC v. Glick, 1980 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'l[ 97,535 (D. Nev. June 12, 1980); SEC v. 
Continental Advisers, 1978 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 'l[ 96,489 (D.D.C. June 29, 1978); SEC v. Penn 
Cent. Co., 425 F. Supp. 593 (E.D. Pa. 1976). 
13. Six federal acts passed between 1933 and 1940 constitute the securities laws. See Se-
curities Act of 1933, ch. 38, tit. 1, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77a-77mm 
(1988)); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended in scat· 
tered sections of 15 U.S.C. (1988)); Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, ch. 687, 
tit. 1, 49 Stat. 803 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 79 to 79z-6 (1988)); Trust Indenture 
Act of 1939, ch. 411, 53 Stat. 1149 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77aaa-77bbbb (1988)); 
Investment Company Act of 1940, ch. 686, tit. 1, 54 Stat. 789 (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. § 80a-1 to 80a-64 (1988)); Investment Advisers Act of 1940, ch. 686, tit. 2, 54 Stat. 847 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 to 80b-21 (1988)). 
Sections of the securities laws containing explicit statutes of limitations include § 13 of the 
Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1988) (mandating that suits be brought within one year after 
discovery of the violation and no more than three years after the security was offered for 
sale);§§ 21and20A of the Securities Exchange Act as amended by§§ 3(a)(2) and 5(b)(4) of 
the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-l(d)(5), 
78t-l(b)(4) (1988) (providing five-year statutes of limitations that begin to run after the sale 
or purchase of a security on inside information); § 9(e) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1988) (stating that "[n]o action shall be maintained to enforce any liability 
created under this section, unless brought within one year after the discovery of the facts 
constituting the violation and within three years after such violation"); § 18(c) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78r(c) (1988) (containing the same limitations as those found 
in§ 9(e)); § 29 of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1988) (same);§ 16(b) of 
the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988) (giving a two-year period beginning 
from the time of obtaining illegal profits in which to bring an action); and § 15 of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(l) {1988) (limiting the SEC to various periods of time 
for bringing actions against brokers and dealers). 
14. This Note uses enforcement suits to mean civil prosecutions by the SEC of alleged 
violators of the securities laws. 
15. See, e.g., Rind, 991 F.2d at 1492-93 (holding 28 U.S.C. § 2415 inapplicable because the 
Commission was asking for disgorgement, an equitable remedy, rather than money damages 
as§ 2415 requires); Lorin, 869 F. Supp. at 1117 {finding that an action seeking disgorgement 
does not fall within 28 U.S.C. § 2462); Glick, 1980 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. {CCH) 'lI 97,535 (finding 
28 U.S.C. § 2462 inapplicable because the plaintiff sought injunctive rather than monetary 
relief). 
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against applying the limitations provisions of title 28, courts often 
cite the important policy objectives served by the securities laws 
with which the imposition of time bars could interfere.16 Although 
courts have held that securities enforcement suits brought by the 
government are not subject to any time bar contained in title 28,17 
this position must be reassessed in light of the passage of the Securi-
ties Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990 
(Remedies Act),18 which gives the SEC the authority to request the 
type of relief - civil fines and penalties - that brings enforcement 
suits within the scope of section 2462.19 
This Note argues that section 2462's limitations period reaches 
all SEC civil suits for monetary fines but not those SEC actions 
seeking equitable relief. Part I interprets section 2462 and, in the 
process, demonstrates that the statute controls SEC enforcement 
suits for civil penalties. Part II argues that SEC actions requesting 
injunctions or disgorgement of profits, unlike those seeking mone-
tary fines, are not subject to the time bar. Finally, Part III asserts 
that SEC administrative enforcement proceedings should not be 
immune from the statute of limitations found in section 2462 of title 
28 because exempting administrative proceedings would be tanta-
mount to making the limitations period optional given the SEC's 
control over the forum in which its enforcement actions are 
litigated. 
16. After the stock market crash of 1929-1932, Congress enacted the securities laws to 
hinder the ability of dishonest companies to raise money in the American capital markets. 
See SEC v. capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963). Congress in-
tended to grant broad authority to the SEC to enforce the securities laws. See Rind, 991 F.2d 
at 1492; In re Johnson, 56 S.E.C. 302 (1994). Section 2 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
states that "[t]ransactions in securities .•. are affected with a national public interest which 
makes it necessary to provide for regulation and control of such transactions." 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78b (1988). This passage from the Exchange Act demonstrates that SEC enforcement ac-
tions serve a public purpose and thus are entitled to the presumption against time bars. See 
supra note 6 and accompanying text; see also Rind, 991 F.2d at 1492 ("Imposing a state or any 
other statute of limitations on Commission civil enforcement actions would also conflict with 
the underlying policies of the securities laws; this conclusion strongly negates any inference 
that Congress intended a limitations period to apply."). 
17. See, e.g., Rind, 991 F.2d at 1492 ("[N]o statute of limitations should apply to Commis-
sion civil enforcement actions."). The Commission does not, however, dispute the applicabil-
ity of the statute of limitations found at 18 U.S.C. § 3282 to its criminal prosecutions. See, 
e.g., United States v. Sloan, 389 F. Supp. 526, 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). 
18. Pub. L. No. 101-429, 104 Stat 931 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
19. Because 28 U.S.C. § 2462 contains a five-year statute of limitations and because the 
Remedies Act was passed in 1990, no court has yet faced this issue. 
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I. THE AMBIGUITIES WITHIN SECTION 2462 AND THE 
SECURITIES LAWS 
With the passage of the Remedies Act in 1990, the SEC re-
ceived an expanded arsenal of civil and administrative sanctions.20 
The SEC now can impose monetary fines for violations of the Se-
curities Act,21 the Securities Exchange Act,22 the Investment Com-
pany Act,23 and the Investment Advisers Act.24 The SEC can also 
now obtain civil penalties, disgorgement, and cease-and-desist or-
ders in administrative proceedings.25 
Because the Remedies Act authorizes the SEC to obtain civil 
fines, suits requesting such relief fall within the ambit of section 
2462 which governs suits for "civil fines, penalties, and forfeitures." 
While section 2462's applicability may on the surface seem quite 
clear, no court has explicitly addressed this issue, and the ambigui-
ties in the language of section 2462 as well as in the securities laws 
could lead future courts to apply the presumption that statutes of 
limitations do not run against the government in the absence of 
20. See RICHARD w. JENNINGS ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERI-
ALS 1467-72 (7th ed. 1992). The House Report announced the reason for the passage of the 
Remedies Ace 
The principal purpose of H.R. 975, the Securities Law Enforcement Remedies Act of 
1990, is to provide the Securities and Exchange Commission (Commission) with new 
remedial authority that will enable the agency to operate its enforcement program in a 
more flexible manner. The legislation is intended to permit the Commission to achieve 
the appropriate level of deterrence in each case and thereby maximize the remedial 
effects of its enforcement actions. 
H.R. REP. No. 429, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1380. See 
generally Arthur B. Laby & W. Hardy Calicott, Patterns of SEC Enforcement Under the 1990 
Remedies Act: Civil Money Penalties, 58 ALB. L. REv. 5 (1994). Laby and Callcott note that 
the length of SEC investigations has increased since the passage of the Remedies Act. Id. at 
50-52. They believe that the increased stakes resulting from the heightened penalties have 
provided a disincentive for defendants to settle the litigation. This increase in time makes the 
need for a statute of limitations to protect defendants even more pressing. 
21. Section 20 states: 
Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any person has violated any provision 
of this subchapter, the rules or regulations thereunder, or a cease-and-desist order en-
tered by the Commission ... other than by committing a violation subject to a penalty 
pursuant to section 78u-1 of this title [which details the penalties for insider trading], the 
Commission may bring an action in a United States district 'court to seek, and the court 
shall have the jurisdiction to impose, upon a proper showing, a civil penalty to be paid by 
the person who committed such a violation. 
15 u.s.c. § 77t(d)(l) (1994). 
22. Section 21( d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 contains language similar to that 
found in § 20 of the Securities Act of 1933, thereby authorizing civil penalties for violations 
of its provisions. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1994). 
23. Section 42(e) embodies this authorization. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-41(e) (1994). 
24. See § 209(e) of the Act codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9(e) (1994). 
25. See JENNINGS ET AL., supra note 20, at 1406. A cease-and-desist order resembles an 
injunction except that it is granted by administrative judges, it does not have the collateral 
consequences of an injunction, and it can be obtained more quickly. Id. at 1469 (quoting S. 
REP. No. 337, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 20-21 (1990)). 
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clear congressional intent that they do so.26 This Part concludes 
that Congress wished section 2462's limitations period to apply to 
SEC proceedings seeking civil fines. Section I.A utilizes the legisla-
tive and judicial history of the statute to interpret the ambiguous 
term enforcement as encompassing actions to impose penalties, as 
well as attempts to collect fines owed by the defendant from earlier 
proceedings. Section I.B argues that the inclusion of statutes of 
limitations in some sections of the securities laws does not indicate 
that Congress intended no limitations to apply to other sections. 
A. The Interpretation of Enforcement 
The meaning of the term enforcement is left somewhat ambigu-
ous by the current language fu section 2462: "Except as otherwise 
provided by Act of Congress, an action, suit or proceeding for the 
enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or 
otherwise, shall not be entertained unless commenced within five 
years from the date when the claim first accrued .... "27 The stat-
ute's stated application to actions for the enforcement of civil fines 
could lead to the conclusion that it only governs proceedings to col-
26. See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text; see also Badaracco v. Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue, 464 U.S. 386 {1984) {holding that statutes of limitation should receive 
strict construction so that any ambiguity is resolved in favor of the government); E.I. DuPont 
de Nemours & Co. v. Davis, 264 U.S. 456 (1924) (same). 
In 3M Co. v. Browner, 17 F.3d 1453 (D.C. Cir. 1994), the court rebutted a citation of the 
Supreme Court presumption in favor of freeing the government from time bars: 
[T]here is another Supreme Court maxim, older still, a maxim specifically relating to 
actions for penalties and one pointing in 9uite the opposite direction: "In a country 
where not even treason can be prosecuted[ ] after a lapse of three years, it could scarcely 
be supposed[] that an individual would remain for[ ]ever liable to a pecuniary 
forfeiture." 
17 F.3d at 1457 (quoting Adams v. Woods, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336, 342 (1805)). 
Commentators have split as to whether the presumption frees the SEC from statutes of 
limitations. Compare Christopher R. Dollase, Comment, The Appeal of Rind: Limitations of 
Actions in Securities and Exchange Commission Civil Enforcement Actions, 49 Bus. LAW. 
1793, 1813-17 {1994) {claiming that the Supreme Court presumption frees the SEC from 
statutes of limitations) with Edward Brodsky, Statute of Limitations and Civil Enforcement, 
N.Y.LJ., Sept. 21, 1993, at 3 and Edward Brodsky & Scott A. Eggers, The Statute of Limita-
tions in SEC Civil Enforcement Actions, 23 SEC. REG. L.J. 123 {1995) and Thomas L. 
Riesenberg, Application of Statutes of Limitations to SEC Disgorgement Actions, INSIGHTS, 
Feb. 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, INSITE File (maintaining that the presumption 
should not free the SEC). 
Note that the government is also not subject to the equitable doctrine of !aches. See 
United States v. Summerlin, 310 U.S. 414, 416 {1940) (stating that !aches does not bar gov-
ernment suits); Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304U.S.126,132 {1938) (same); SEC v. 
Williams, 884 F. Supp. 28, 29 (D. Mass. 1995); SEC v. Willis, 777 F. Supp. 1165, 1175 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991). Note further that even in the absence of a statute of limitations or !aches, 
courts may still take into account both the length of time it took the SEC to bring suit and 
factors relating to the burden of the requested remedy on the defendant in deciding whether 
to grant equitable relief. See SEC v. Rind, 991F.2d1486, 1492 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. 
Ct. 439 (1993); Williams, 884 F. Supp. at 31; Willis, 777 F. Supp. at 1174. Balancing such 
factors mitigates the potentially harsh result reached in this Note that enforcement suits re-
questing equitable relief are currently free from time bars. See infra Part II. 
27. 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (1988) (emphasis added). 
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lect penalties levied in earlier actions from defendants. Such an in-
terpretation would free most SEC civil prosecutions from section 
2462's restriction because these suits impose penalties, rather than 
merely collect fines already owed. 
The circuit courts have not decided upon a uniform interpreta-
tion of enforcement. Most courts assume without debate that sec-
tion 2462 applies to suits seeking to impose penalties or 
forfeitures.28 In Capozzi v. United States,w however, the Second 
Circuit maintained that enforcement "is the collection of amounts 
owed, not the assessment of them."30 The District of Columbia Cir-
cuit in 3M Co. v. Browner subsequently rejected the Capozzi defini-
tion of enforcement.31 In 3M Co., the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) argued that enforcement "connotes an action to col-
lect a penalty already imposed. "32 3M countered with the argument 
that enforce equals impose and, as further support, pointed out that 
no statute of limitations would apply to the EPA in this situation if 
the court adopted the EPA's interpretation. 
The court sided with 3M because the history of section 2462 
demonstrates that Congress intended the section to cover suits that 
impose penalties as well as collection actions.33 From 1799 through 
its initial codification in title 28 in 1940 as section 791, the language 
of the general statute of limitations, now found in section 2462, re-
mained essentially unchanged. The earlier version of the statute 
stated that "[n]o suit or prosecution for any penalty or forfeiture, 
pecuniary or otherwise, accruing under the laws of the United 
28. See, e.g., Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148 (1956); Action for Children's 
Television v. FCC, 59 F.3d 1249, 1254 (D.C. Cir. 1995); United States v. Walsh, 8 F.3d 659, 
662 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1830 (1994); United States v. 2 Burditt Street, 924 
F.2d 383, 385 (1st Cir. 1991); Public Interest Research Group v. Powell Duffryn Tenninals 
Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 74 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1109 (1991); United States v. Core 
Lab., Inc., 759 F.2d 480 (5th Cir. 1985). 
29. 980 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1992). The Capozzi defendant was challenging the IRS's assess-
ment of penalties under 26 U.S.C. § 6700 (1988). 
30. 980 F.2d at 875. 
31. 17 F.3d 1453, 1459 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
32. 17 F.3d at 1457. 
33. 17 F.3d at 1458-59. Furthermore, the nature of IRS proceedings at issue in Capozzi 
distinguishes that case from enforcement suits in other areas. If the IRS believes a taxpayer 
owes more taxes than she paid, it conducts an ex parte proceeding to detennine the amount 
of money owed, including penalties. Any suit brought in federal court attempts to collect this 
money. The Second Circuit relied on the uniqueness of IRS procedure as an additional justi-
fication for not applying § 2462 to the proceeding establishing the money the defendant 
owes. See Capozzi, 980 F.2d at 874. The broader relevance of Capozzi is thus arguably 
limited because many agencies, including the SEC, do not conduct ex parte proceedings to 
assess penalties. 
A federal district court within the Second Circuit discussed the relationship between 
Capozzi and 3M Co. in a case addressing the applicability of § 2462 to SEC enforcement 
suits. The court, however, declined to determine whether Capozzi should be limited to the 
unique circumstances of the IRS. See SEC v. Lorin, 869 F. Supp. 1117, 1122 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 
1994). 
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States, shall be maintained, except in cases where it is otherwise 
specially provided, unless the same is commenced within five years 
from the time when the penalty or forfeiture accrued."34 When 
Congress modified the rules governing the federal judiciary in 1948, 
it added the word enforcement to the description of the actions to 
which the statute applies and removed the term prosecution.35 In 
the legislative history accompanying the 1948 revisions to the judi-
cial code, Congress referred to these adjustments as mere changes 
to "phraseology,"36 thereby indicating that it did not intend to re-
vise the substance of the statute. Furthermore, traditional notions 
of statutory construction hold that such modifications to language 
do not alter the meaning of the statute.37 
Interpretations of section 2462's predecessors thus apply with 
equal force to section 2462. Because the prior versions of section 
2462 unambiguously provided a statute of limitations for any suit 
seeking to impose a fine, penalty, or forfeiture, the addition of the 
word enforcement to section 2462 should not limit the statute's rele-
vance to suits collecting fines assessed in earlier proceedings.38 This 
demonstration of congressional intent is sufficient to override the 
presumption that statutes of limitation do not run against the 
government. 
B. The Effect of the Doctrine of Expressio Unius et Exclusio 
Alterius Est 
The SEC has used the doctrine of expressio unius et exclusio 
alterius est to challenge the applicability of statutes of limitations to 
its suits. This statutory-construction doctrine holds that the express 
inclusion of one thing means the exclusion of all others.39 Because 
the securities laws contain statutes of limitations governing private 
causes of action, the SEC reasons that the absence of time bars 
from most of the statutory provisions granting it the authority to 
34. 28 U.S.C. § 791 {1940). In the years immediately preceding 1940, this time bar could 
be found in Rev. Stat. § 1047. The first version of the statute appeared in the Act of Mar. 2, 
1799, § 89, 1 Stat. 627, 695-96. Subsequent versions of the statute of limitations are found in 
the following acts: Act of Mar. 26, 1804, § 3, 2 Stat. 290, 290-91; Act of Apr. 20, 1818, § 6, 3 
Stat. 450, 452; Act of Feb. 28, 1839, § 4, 5 Stat. 321, 322; Act of Mar. 3, 1863, § 14, 12 Stat. 737, 
741-42; and Act of July 25, 1868, § 1, 15 Stat. 183, 183. 
35. To compare the language of the two versions of the statute, compare the text accom-
panying note 27 with the text accompanying note 34. 
36. See H.R. REP. No. 3214, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. Al91 (1948), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE 
H1sroRY OF TITLE 28, UNITED STATES CODE "JUDICIARY AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURE" (Roy 
M. Mersky & J. Myron Jacobstein eds., 1971). 
37. See Keene Corp. v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2035, 2041 {1993); Fmley v. United 
States, 490 U.S. 545, 554 {1989); 3M Co. v. Browner, 17 F.3d 1453, 1458 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
38. See 17 F.3d at 1458-59. 
39. See 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CoNsrRucnoN § 47.23 {5th 
ed. 1992); see also United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1850 n.9 
{1995); Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 115 S. Ct. 1483, 1488 {1995). 
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sue must indicate a congressional intention not to restrict the 
SEC.40 
Two considerations reduce the impact of the doctrine in the con-
text of the securities laws. First, evidence of contrary legislative in-
tent overrides the doctrine.41 As discussed in section I.A, 
legislative history indicates that Congress wished to limit the win-
dow of opportunity for bringing suits, such as SEC enforcement ac-
tions, to five years. 
Second, the court in United States v. Incorporated Village of 
Island Park42 rejected the use of the expressio unius doctrine in in-
terpreting the Fair Housing Act to prevent the use of section 2462. 
Like the securities laws, the Fair Housing Act has time bars gov-
erning suits based on certain of its sections, while none controls 
those invoking other sections of the Act. The court declined to in-
terpret the absence of a statute of limitations as conclusive evidence 
of congressional intent to free government suits brought under 
these sections from any time restriction and found section 2462 
applicable.43 
40. See SEC v. Rind, 991 F.2d 1486, 1490 (9th Cir.) ("Congress clearly devoted its time 
and attention to limitations issues. The fact that it did not enact an express statute of limita-
tions for lawsuits instituted by the Commission, therefore, must be interpreted as deliber-
ate."), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 439 (1993); Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
Rind, 991 F.2d 1486 (9th Cir.) (No. 91-55972), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 439 (1993). 
41. See 2A SINGER, supra note 39, § 47.23. 
42. 791 F. Supp. 354 (E.D.N.Y. 1992). The Second Circuit also has rejected reliance on 
the expressio unius doctrine to determine the impact of § 2462 but did so in the context of 
holding § 2462 inapplicable to suits under a section of the IRC. See Capozzi v. United States, 
980 F.2d 872, 875 (2d Cir. 1992). As discussed supra in note 33, the outcome of Capozzi can 
be limited to the uniqueness of IRS procedure. 
43. See 791 F. Supp. at 367 ("Indeed, it may well be that Congress enacted present Sec-
tion 3614 both with an eye toward the rule that the United States is not subject to statutes of 
limitations unless otherwise provided and with an eye toward Section 2462. "). 
The expressio unius doctrine, when applied to title 28, could argue against applying§ 2462 
to the federal government. Unlike § 2462, other areas of title 28 specifically name the gov-
ernment when their provisions apply to it, see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2415 (1988), thereby implying 
that § 2462 does not impact suits by the United States. This argument must fail because 
evidence of legislative intent to have § 2462 restrict government suits exists to overcome the 
doctrine. Furthermore, in a case addressing the applicability of the version of the statute 
contained in the Act of February 28, 1839, § 4, 5 Stat. 322, to the United States government, 
the court held that the general understanding of the terminology used in the Act indicates an 
intention to include the United States within its scope. See United States v. Maillard, 26 F. 
Cas. 1140, 1142 (S.D.N.Y. 1871) (No. 15,709). The court rejected the government's conten-
tion that because § 4 fails to declare that government-initiated suits are controlled by its 
strictures, the congressional purpose to apply the statute of limitations is not clear enough to 
override the presumption against restricting the government with time bars. Section 2462, as 
a direct descendent of § 4, also should control government suits seeking civil penalties, even 
though it too does not explicitly proclaim its applicability to the government. 
More recent case law likewise supports holding the government subject to the § 2462 
limitation for civil prosecutions. See, e.g., United States v. Walsh, 8 F.3d 659 (9th Cir. 1993), 
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1830 (1994); Iran Air v. Kugelman, 996 F.2d 1253 (D.C. Cir. 1993); 
United States v. Meyer, 808 F.2d 912 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v. N.O.C., Inc., No. 
CIV.A. 87-3539, 1988 WL 109727 (D.N.J. Oct. 14, 1988); Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Bethle-
hem Steel Corp., 608 F. Supp. 440 (D. Md. 1985). The United States has even on occasion 
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Despite the strong arguments in favor of applying section 2462 
to SEC enforcement suits, it is admittedly troubling that Congress 
created a five-year time bar, the same length as section 2462, for 
SEC suits seeking civil fines for insider trading.44 Although the leg-
islative histories for the insider trading acts do not specifically ad-
dress this issue, they suggest that Congress felt a need to hold the 
SEC to a time bar in no uncertain terms given the long judicial 
history against limiting the period for bringing enforcement suits.45 
Because these insider trading acts were the first time the SEC was 
able to seek civil penalties, and thus no prior enforcement suits 
were of the type to which section 2462 applied, the long-held judi-
cial stance against restricting enforcement suits by time bars made 
acknowledged that§ 2462 affects its litigation. See, e.g., N.O.C., Inc., 1988 WL 109727, at *5; 
United States v. Magnolia Motor & Logging Co., 208 F. Supp. 63, 65 (N.D. Cal. 1962). In 
fact, several plaintiffs have challenged the applicability of § 2462 to suits brought by a non-
state actor because of the understanding that § 2462 imposes a statute of limitations on ac-
tions initiated by the United States. See, e.g., Public Interest Research Group v. Powell Duf-
fryn Tenninals Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 74 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1109 (1991) 
(subjecting private litigants to § 2462 because they were "acting as an adjunct to government 
enforcement actions"); Sierra Club v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 834 F.2d 1517, 1520 (9th Cir. 
1987); Bodne v. Geo A. Rheman Co., 811 F. Supp. 218, 221 (D.S.C. 1993); Connecticut Fund 
for Envt. v. Job Plating Co., 623 F. Supp. 207, 211 (D. Conn. 1985). 
44. The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 first authorized the SEC to impose civil 
fines in enforcement suits and also restricted the SEC with a statute of limitations. The sanc-
tioning mechanism for insider trading was redesigned by the Insider Trading and Securities 
Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 which placed the time bar in 15 U.S.C. § 78u-l(d)(5) (1994). 
45. The legislative history for the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 comments on the 
Act's five-year statute of limitations: 
The legislation provides that an action to seek the new civil penalty may not be brought 
more than five years after the date of the purchase or sale that constitutes the violation. 
The limitation is applicable solely to actions brought under this legislation. The limita-
tion does not bar or limit any other actions by the Commission or the Attorney General, 
nor does it bar actions to recover penalties which were imposed in actions brought 
within the five-year period. 
INSIDER TRADING SANCTIONS Acr OF 1984, H.R. REP. No. 355, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 
(1983), reprinted in BERNARD D. REAMS, JR., INSIDER TRADING AND THE LAW: A LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY OF THE INSIDER TRADING SANCTIONS Acr OF 1984, PUB. LAW No. 98-376, at 
12 {1989). Note that as originally drafted, the legislation did not include a statute of limita-
tions. See Insider Trading Sanctions and SEC Enforcement Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 
559 Before the Subcomm on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, & Finance of the 
House Comm on Energy & Commerce, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-6 (1983), reprinted in REAMS, 
supra, at 4-6. 
In hearings on the proposed legislation, the Honorable John S. R. Shad, Chairman of the 
SEC, and other members of the SEC staff suggested that the legislative subcommittee clarify 
a variety of issues left unresolved by the initial draft of the bill, including the issue of statutes 
of limitations. Id. at 15. In a memorandum, Shad stated that a time bar should perhaps be 
imposed because of the large sums of money involved and suggested a five-year period be-
cause "[a]nything less would result in the anomalous result that the Attorney General could 
bring a criminal action until five years after the violation and the Commission could bring an 
injunctive action, but could not seek the civil penalty during all of that period." Id. at 46. 
The legislative history of the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 
1988 did not address the issue, merely stating that the legislation "dictates that no action 
pursuant to this section may be brought more than 5 years after the date of the last transac-
tion that formed the basis of the violation." H.R. REP. No. 910, lOOth Cong., 2d Sess. 39 
{1988). 
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the need to provide explicitly for a statute of limitations more 
pressing. 
II. THE DIFFERENCES AMONG SEC REMEDIES 
Section 2462 only governs suits for "civil fines, penalties, and 
forfeitures." As Part I demonstrated, SEC enforcement suits re-
questing civil penalties fall within the scope of section 2462. Classi-
fying the SEC's equitable remedies as penalties or forfeitures, 
however, presents a closer question. This Part argues that section 
2462 does not impose a time bar on those SEC-initiated suits re-
questing equitable relief, such as injunctions and disgorgement, be-
cause the nature of such relief is not the type included within 
section 2462. 
The SEC's remedies throughout most of its history have been 
limited to equitable, injunctive-type relief,46 except for the civil 
penalties it could obtain for insider trading47 and a few other speci-
fied offenses.48 The SEC seeks this equitable relief in federal court 
or in administrative proceedings. Federal courts will grant the 
SEC's request for an injunction, which often consists of ordering 
the defendant to stop engaging in the illegal activities at issue, buy-
ing or selling stock or destroying records,49 if it appears likely that 
the defendant will violate the securities laws again.so The SEC pre-
fers injunctions to administrative remedies because of .their collat-
eral effects51 and the threat of contempt if defendants disobey the 
46. See JENNINGS ET AL., supra note 20, at 1404. 
47. The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 gave the SEC the 
authority to obtain civil penalties from defendants convicted of insider trading. See 15 U .S.C. 
§ 78u-l(a)(l) (1988). The Act contains its own five-year time bar that begins to run on the 
date of the alleged unlawful activity. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-l(d)(5) (1988). 
48. The legislative history of the Remedies Act describes these other offenses. First, the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1988 gives the SEC the authority to impose penalties "not 
to exceed $10,000 against an issuer, or certain persons acting on behalf of an issuer, who 
violates Section 30(a) of the Exchange Act." H.R. REP. No. 429, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 16 n.4 
(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1380, 1385. Additionally, issuers face fines of up to 
$100 per day for failure to file certain information in compliance with § 32(b) of the Ex-
change Act. 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1385. Congress states that, as of 1990, only one case had 
imposed the fine authorized by§ 32(b). Id. 
49. See JENNINGS ET AL., supra note 20, at 1405. 
50. See SEC v. Bilzerian, 29 F.3d 689, 695 (D.C. Cir. 1994). In deciding whether a risk of 
future infractions of the securities laws exists, courts weigh " 'whether a defendant's violation 
was isolated or part of a pattern, whether the violation was flagrant and deliberate or merely 
technical in nature, and whether the defendant's business will present opportunities to violate 
the law in the future.'" 29 F.3d at 695 (quoting SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 
1228 (D.C. Cir. 1989)). 
51. If defendants are found guilty of infractions in an SEC enforcement suit, they risk 
private litigants invoking the doctrine of collateral estoppel to obtain damages based on the 
prior SEC judgment against the defendants. See JENNINGS ET AL., supra note 20, at 1405. 
Collateral estoppel prevents relitigation of legal and factual issues decided in an earlier pro-
ceeding. See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.5 (1979). 
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order.52 Since 1971, as part of their injunction decrees, the courts 
also have ordered defendants to tum over any of the illegal profits 
they obtained; this remedy is known as "disgorgement."53 
The SEC also brings enforcement actions administratively. Ad-
ministrative judges were historically limited to authorizing the SEC 
to issue a stop order to prevent the release of a misleading registra-
tion statement;54 to censure broker-dealersss and potentially even 
bar them from all future participation in the securities industry;56 to 
suspend the trading of securities of a corporation not in compliance 
with the laws;57 and to order individuals to comply with certain dis-
closure requirements.ss 
Injunctions and disgorgement are not covered by section 2462 
because they are remedial rather than punitive, a distinction the 
Supreme Court has relied upon in interpreting the ancestor of sec-
Additionally, federal and state statutes often prevent a person subject to an injunction 
from involvement in the securities industry. See JENNINGS ET AL., supra note 20, at 1424. See 
generally Thomas J. Andre, Jr., The Collateral Consequences of SEC Injunctive Relief: Mild 
Prophylactic or Perpetual Hazard?, 1981 U. ILL. L. REv. 625. 
52. See JENNINGS ET AL., supra note 20, at 1425. 
53. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1307-08 (2d Cir. 1971) (authorizing 
the remedy of disgorgement for the first time); see also SEC v. Penn Cent. Co., 425 F. Supp. 
593, 598 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (holding that courts can award disgorgement under the provisions of 
the securities laws granting the Commission the power to seek injunctions). 
54. See Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 8(d)-(e), 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. § 77h(d)-(e) (1994)). 
55. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 15, 48 Stat. 895 (codified as amended 
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o(b)(4), (6) (1994)). 
56. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 19, 48 Stat. 898 (codified as amended 
at 15 U.S.C. § 78s(h) (1994)). 
57. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, §§ 12, 15, 48 Stat. 892 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78/(k), 78o(c)(5) (1994)). 
58. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 15, 48 Stat. 895 (codified as amended 
at 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(4) (1994)). In addition, the SEC can prevent attorneys and accountants 
that violate the standards contained in Rule 2(e) from practicing before it. See JENNINGS ET 
AL., supra note 20, at 1406. 
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tion 2462,59 according to a view long-held by courts.60 One court 
that discussed the application of section 2462 to SEC enforcement 
proceedings dismissed the defense on the grounds that the SEC was 
asking for an injunction, a type of relief which "is not intended to 
punish or penalize. "61 
As with injunctions, courts have rejected defendants' attempts 
to assert section 2462 of title 28 as a defense to SEC suits requesting 
disgorgement of profits based on the well-established principle that 
the remedy is not punitive.62 Disgorgement, by returning parties to 
59. See Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 236 U.S. 412, 423 (1915) (refusing to apply § 1047 
of the Revised Statutes, a predecessor to § 2462, because "the liability sought to be enforced 
was not punitive but strictly remedial"); Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of At-
lanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906) (holding that the statute of limitations in § 1047 of the Revised 
Statutes does not apply to a suit for treble damages because it is not a suit for a penalty or 
forfeiture); Brady v. Daly, 175 U.S. 148 (1899) (deciding that an action for damages is not 
one for a penalty or forfeiture). 
A recent Court decision defined punishment for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. 
The Court stated that "a civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial 
purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent pur-
poses, is punishment." United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989). The Court limited 
its holding to those cases "where a fixed-penalty provision subjects a prolific but small-gauge 
offender to a sanction overwhelmingly disproportionate to the damages he has caused." 490 
U.S. at 449. This limitation clarifies that the Halper definition does not control determina-
tions of whether SEC injunctive relief is a penalty because the actual form of the injunction is 
not set by statute and is not disproportionate to the harm caused by the defendant. 
60. See, e.g., SEC v. Williams, 884 F. Supp. 28, 30 (D. Mass. 1995); SEC v. Penn Cent. Co., 
425 F. Supp. 593, 599 (E.D. Pa. 1976); see also JENNINGS ET AL., supra note 20, at 1405. The 
SEC is so confident of the rule that its suits seeking injunctions are not subject to any time 
bars that it sought Rule 11 sanctions against a defendant who raised a statute of limitations 
defense to an enforcement proceeding seeking an injunction. See SEC v. Keating, (1992] 
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) <j[ 96,906 (C.D. Cal. July 23, 1992). But see Edwin Martenet, Statutes 
of Limitations on SEC Enforcement Proceedings, 41 VA. L. REv. 59, 67-72 (1955) (arguing 
that the injunctive relief available to the SEC is a penalty within the meaning of § 2462); 
Gary P. Naftalis & Mark J. Headley, SEC Actions Seeking to Bar Securities Professionals, 
N.Y.LJ., June 12, 1995, at 1 (asserting that injunctions which revoke the licenses of securities 
professionals are penalties). 
61. SEC v. Glick, [1980] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) <j[ 97,535 (D. Nev. June 12, 1980). 
62. See SEC v. Bilzerian, 29 F.3d 689, 696 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding that disgorgement is 
not punishment for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause; "[d]isgorgement is no less re-
medial in nature merely because victims other than the government have been injured by 
Bilzerian's violations of the securities laws"); SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 
1230-31 (D.C. Cir.1989) (characterizing disgorgement as an equitable remedy that serves the 
goals of depriving wrongdoers of their profits as well as deterrent, but not punitive, pur-
poses); SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1335 (5th Cir. 1978) (asserting that disgorgement is not 
punitive because it is only based on the amount the defendant gained from her harmful ac-
tions; any amount granted above this would be a penalty); Williams, 884 F. Supp. at 31; SEC 
v. Lorin, 869 F. Supp. 1117, 1123 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) ("[D]isgorgement is similar to the re-
dressing of a private injury in that both serve to return affected parties to the status quo 
before the unlawful activity at issue had taken place. That goal appears, by definition, to be 
remedial."); SEC v. Egan, 821 F. Supp. 1274, 1275 (N.D. Ill. 1993) ("[D]isgorgement is an 
inherently equitable remedy."); Penn Cent. Co., 425 F. Supp. at 599 ("We reject the conten-
tion that the SEC seeks disgorgement for punitive reasons. The relief sought is remedial, 
depriving defendants of the rewards they obtained by violating the securities laws. Such 
action serves to protect the investing public by providing an effective deterrent to future 
violations."). Professors Louis Loss and Joel Seligman stated, during congressional testi-
mony, that "judicial decisions have emphatically rejected the argument that disgorgement is 
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the status quo before the illegal activities, acts to remedy the injus-
tice caused by violations of the securities laws.63 It escapes charac-
terization as punitive because it only mandates that defendants turn 
over the illegal profits; the amount disgorged is calculated by sub-
tracting the costs incurred in generating the profits from the 
amount obtained in violation of the securities laws.64 
Because disgorgement is neither a statutory fine nor a penal 
sanction, it is not a forfeiture as the term is used in section 2462. 
Commentators, however, have argued for classifying disgorgement 
as a forfeiture. 65 The confusion arises, in part, because courts have 
referred to disgorgement as a forfeiture in the past,66 although 
never in the context of section 2462. In cases where defendants as-
serted a section 2462 defense, courts have often used forfeiture in-
terchangeably with statutory fines or penalties.67 For example, in 
the most recent case to address this issue, the District of Columbia 
punitive or penal in nature." Declaration of Louis Loss and Joel Seligman (April 18, 1994) 
(on file with author). 
Decisions outside the securities-law context further support classifying disgorgement as 
non-punitive. See, e.g., United States v. Moffitt, Zwerling & Kemler, P.C., 875 F. Supp. 1190, 
1197 (E.D. Va. 1995) (finding that criminal forfeitures serve remedial purposes); Crowder v. 
United States, 874 F. Supp. 700, 704 (M.D.N.C. 1994) (finding that forfeitures are not puni-
tive where the defendant "was never entitled to [the] proceeds"). In United States v. Tilley, 
18 F.3d 295, 300 {5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 573 (1994), a decision in which the defend-
ant was forced to tum over the profits he obtained from drug sales, much like disgorgement. 
The court noted the non-punitive character of this sanction because the defendant was not 
required to give up anything to which he ever had a legal claim. But see Cisneros v. Cost 
Control Mktg. & Sales Management, 862 F. Supp. 1531, 1534 (W.D. Va. 1994), affd. sub nom. 
United States Dept of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Cost Control Mktg. & Sales Management, 
1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 25285 (4th Cir. Sept. 8, 1995) (holding that§ 523(a)(7) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code which refers to "a fine, penalty, or forfeiture" encompasses a disgorgement). 
For arguments that disgorgement is a penalty or forfeiture, thus placing actions seeking 
that form of remedy within the ambit of § 2462, see Brodsky & Eggers, supra note 26, at 135-
42; Jonathan Eisenberg & Benjamin Haskin, Statutes of Limitations Made Applicable to SEC 
Actions, INSIGHTS, July 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, INSITE File; Brodsky, supra 
note 26; Richard L. Stone & Aron Jaroslawicz, Statute of Limitations on Actions Brought by 
SEC, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 24, 1994, at 1. 
63. See Lorin, 869 F. Supp. at 1122. 
64. See Lorin, 869 F. Supp. at 1124 (citing Litton Indus. v. Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb Inc., 
734 F. Supp. 1071, 1077 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)); see also Herrmann v. Steinberg, 812 F.2d 63, 66 {2d 
Cir. 1987) (allowing defendants to deduct transaction costs from the amount disgorged); Oliff 
v. Exchange Intl. Corp., 669 F.2d 1162, 1168 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 915 (1981) 
(same); cf. SEC v. R.J. Allen & Assoc., 386 F. Supp. 866, 881 (S.D. Fla. 1974) (authorizing 
disgorgement of profits without specifying the method for calculating the disgorgement 
amount). 
65. See, e.g., Brodsky & Eggers, supra note 26. 
66. See Cisneros, 862 F. Supp. at 1534 (classifying disgorgement as a "fine, penalty, or 
forfeiture" for the purposes of§ 523(a)(7) of the Bankruptcy Code); SEC v. Telsey, 144 B.R. 
563, 565 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1992) (same); see also Brodsky & Eggers, supra note 26, at 138 & 
n.61 (listing cases). 
67. See, e.g., Toepleman v. United States, 263 F.2d 697 (4th Cir. 1959) (equating the statu-
tory fine of $2000 for violations of the False Claims Act, which the court characterized as a 
forfeiture, with the type of forfeitures to which § 2462 refers); see also Austin v. United 
States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2808 (1993) (noting that " 'forfeit' is the word Congress used for fine" 
in early legislation in addition to the relinquishment of property). Austin also noted that the 
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Circuit referred to the monetary fines that the Federal Communica-
tions Commission can obtain from broadcasters of indecent mate-
rial as "forfeiture penalties."68 Other cases also emphasize the 
penal nature of forfeiture as used in section 2462. These courts ap-
ply section 2462 in situations where the defendant's previously ex-
isting, valid right to some property is taken away as a penalty for 
illegal activity,69 which differs from disgorgement where the defend-
ant has no legal right to the money turned over. 
III. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 
Whether conducted in a traditional court or in an administrative 
tribunal, SEC enforcement actions serve the purpose of deterring 
violations of the securities laws and protecting the integrity of the 
markets. This factor, when combined with the SEC's complete dis-
cretion in choosing the forum for an enforcement suit, results in the 
conclusion that the same statute of limitations applies to adminis-
trative enforcement suits as to those in federal court.70 With the 
passage of the Remedies Act in 1990, the SEC was authorized for 
the first time to obtain civil penalties in administrative adjudica-
tions71 and thus potentially subject to section 2462. In addition to 
fines, the Act authorized disgorgement and cease-and-desist or-
ders;72 all of these remedies represent a vast expansion of the small 
purpose of all types of forfeitures has always been, in part, to punish. 113 S. Ct. at 2810 & 
n.12. 
68. See South Fork Broadcasting Corp. v. FCC, 59 F.3d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Section 
503(b)(1)(D) of title 47 of the U.S.C. authorizes the FCC to obtain a "forfeiture penalty," the 
amount of which is unrelated to the damage caused by the defendant or profits received, 
unlike disgorgement. See also infra note 69 for a discussion of the definition of forfeiture. 
69. See, e.g., United States v. 2 Burditt Street, 924 F.2d 383, 385 (1st Cir. 1991) (assuming 
that § 2462 governed a suit against a defendant convicted under the Controlled Substances 
Act, who was forced to tum over his real property connected to his offense); H.P. Lambert 
Co. v. Secretary of Treasury, 354 F.2d 819, 822 (1st Cir. 1965) (finding that§ 2462 applied to 
an action to revoke a customhouse broker's license); United States v. Maillard, 26 F. Cas. 
1140, 1143 (S.D.N.Y. 1871) (No. 15,709) (interpreting "forfeiture," as used in § 2462's prede-
cessor, to encompass a case in which a defendant was forced to give up goods illegally im-
ported into the United States or their cash equivalent). 
Furthermore, Black's Law Dictionary defines forfeiture as "a divestiture of specific prop-
erty without compensation; it imposes a loss by the taking away of some preexisting valid 
right without compensation." BLACK'S LAw D1cnoNARY 650 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis 
added). 
70. See 3M Co. v. Browner, 17 F.3d 1453, 1455-57 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (discussing the contin-
ued validity of the policies behind having statutes of limitations in the administrative con-
text); Naftalis & Headley, supra note 60, at 1, 4; Stone & Jaroslawicz, supra note 62, at 1. See 
generally Teresa A. Holderer, Note, Enforcement of TSCA and the Federal Five-Year Statute 
of Limitations for Penalty Actions, 91 MlcH. L. REv. 1023 (1993) (arguing for the application 
of § 2462 to administrative actions by the EPA under the Toxic Substances Control Act of 
1976). 
71. See JENNINGS ET AL, supra note 20, at 1406. 
72. See id.; see also supra note 25. 
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class of orders available administratively before the Act.73 The 
likely increased use of administrative actions in light of the Reme-
dies Act74 enhances the importance of having a statute of limita-
tions available to protect defendants from stale claims brought 
administratively. This Part argues that SEC enforcement actions 
seeking civil fines are subject to the section 2462 statute of limita-
tions whether the proceedings are conducted in a federal court or in 
an administrative tribunal.7s 
Section 2462 only states that it applies to an "action, suit or pro-
ceeding for the enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or forfei-
ture,"76 leaving the issue of forum ambiguous. An examination of 
the history of the statute, however, demonstrates a congressional 
intent to apply the time bar to administrative proceedings. Earlier 
versions of section 2462 included prosecutions within the list of ac-
tions controlled by the time bar.77 The removal of prosecutions 
from the statute, a~cording to traditional notions of statutory con-
struction, did not change the overall meaning of the statute.78 Sec-
tion 2462, therefore, also controls prosecutions, which include 
administrative proceedings according to the Administrative Proce-
dure Act.79 
Lower courts have concluded that section 2462 governs adminis-
trative actions, both implicitlyso and explicitly.81 The SEC adminis-
73. See supra text accompanying notes 54-58. 
74. See JENNINGS ET AL., supra note 20, at 1467; see also supra notes 20-25 and accompa-
nying text (discussing how the Remedies Act changed the enforcement tools available to the 
SEC). 
Agencies generally prefer using administrative fora because of the perceived advantage of 
litigating on one's "home turr• and because such actions are less expensive than judicial 
proceedings. See JENNINGS ET AL., supra note 20, at 1405. Additionally, the SEC's ability to 
receive civil fines and cease-and-desist orders in the administrative forum may give the SEC 
an edge in enforcement suits because of the increasing reluctance of courts to issue injunc-
tions. Id. at 1404. 
75. For an early dismissal of the claim that SEC administrative actions are free from the 
§ 2462 statute of limitations, see Martenet, supra note 60, at 62-67. 
76. 28 u.s.c. § 2462 (1988). 
77. Compare supra text accompanying note 27 with supra text accompanying note 34. 
78. See supra text accompanying notes 35-37. 
79. 3M Co. v. Browner, 17 F.3d 1453, 1456 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ("According to the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act, agency attorneys who bring administrative complaints, including com-
plaints for civil penalties, are performing 'prosecuting functions.' "). 
The use of the term proceeding in § 2462 would seem to bring administrative actions 
under the purview of the statute. Proceeding was added to the statute as part of the revisions 
to the Judicial Code in 1948. Because such revisions do not change the substance of the 
statue, reliance on the use of proceeding to justify applying § 2462 to administrative actions 
would be misguided. See In re Baird & Co., 52 S.E.C. 17, n.3 (1966). 
80. See, e.g., United States Dept. of Labor v. Old Ben Coal Co., 676 F.2d 259 (7th Cir. 
1982); United States v. McCune, 763 F. Supp. 916 (S.D. Ohio 1989). 
81. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Federal Aviation Admin., 28 F.3d 111 {9th Cir. 1994); 3M Co., 17 
F.3d at 1457 ("Given the reasons why we have statutes of limitations, there is no discernible 
rationale for applying§ 2462 when the penalty action or proceeding is brought in a court, but 
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trative judges, however, have always claimed that their hearings are 
not subject to the section 2462 statute of limitations.82 An adminis-
trative judge in one of these cases, In re Baird & Co.,83 relied on 
several bases for declining to apply the statute: title 28 is entitled 
the Judicial Code, thus giving rise to the presumption that its provi-
sions only apply to federal courts; administrative proceedings are 
governed by the Administrative Procedure Act, and, if Congress 
had intended such actions to be subject to a time bar, it would have 
included a limitation in the Act; the Securities Exchange Act im-
poses time bars on some civil actions, therefore the absence of stat-
utes of limitations controlling the SEC indicates congressional 
intention not to restrict the agency; SEC enforcement actions are 
remedial rather than punitive; and, finally, SEC prosecutions serve 
the public interest. 84 Whatever merit these arguments may have 
once held, they cannot stand in the face of consistent judicial appli-
cation of section 2462 to administrative proceedings and the history 
of section 2462.85 No justification exists for treating the SEC differ-
not when it is brought in an administrative agency."); Capozzi v. United States, 980 F.2d 872, 
874 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that the phrase "action, suit, or proceeding" within § 2462 "impli-
cate[s] some adversarial adjudication, be it administrative or judicial"); United States v. 
N.O.C., Inc., No. CIV.A. 87-3539, 1988 WL 109727, at *7 (D.N.J. Oct. 14, 1988). 
82. See In re Johnson, 56 S.E.C. 302 (1994); In re Baird & Co., 52 S.E.C. at 17. In Com-
mission cases where the administrative judges held that no statute of limitations applied to 
the SEC, injunctive-type relief was at issue, a type of remedy that automatically makes such 
cases fall outside the control of § 2462. See supra Part II. Prior to the enactment of the 
Remedies Act, the SEC could not obtain civil penalties administratively so it comes as no 
surprise that cases have not held that § 2462 applies to administrative proceedings. In the 
one SEC administrative case since the passage of the Remedies Act where § 2462 was raised 
as a defense, the SEC was not seeking a civil penalty. See In re Johnson, 56 S.E.C. at 302. 
Administrative judges with the Commodities Future Trading Commission (CFTC) have 
also declined to hold their agency bound by § 2462. The judges have acknowledged that the 
type of relief sought by the CFTC in the cases precluded application of this statute of limita-
tions. See, e.g., In re Side!, [1992-1994 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 'l! 25,824 
(Sept. 3, 1993); In re O'Malley, [1992-1994 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 'll 
25,820 (Sept. 2, 1993); In re Segal, [1990-1992 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 'll 
25,162 (Nov. 5, 1991); In re Hunt, [1987-1990 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 'll 
24,009 (Nov. 6, 1987). 
83. 52 S.E.C. 17 (1966). 
84. See 52 S.E.C. at 17 (construing In re Thomson & McKinnon, (File No. 7-12769)). 
85. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text. 
The terminology and structure of title 28, at first glance, do lend some support for the 
exemption of administrative actions from its provisions. For example, certain sections make 
explicit reference to agencies, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 451, 2341 (1988), thereby implying under the 
expressio unius doctrine that the other sections not do not govern administrative actions. 
Also, the definition of courts contained in title 28 does not specifically mention administra-
tive tribunals. The appearance of § 2462 in Part VI of title 28 dealing with fines and forfeit-
ures, entitled "Particular Proceedings," however, leads to the inference that the statute 
applies to all proceedings of a particular type. Thus, the time bar should apply to all actions, 
whether conducted in a federal court or agency tribunal, seeking a civil fine, penalty, or 
forfeiture. 
The federal government, in another context, also argued that § 2462 must only apply to 
suits in federal court because of 28 U.S.C. § 2461 (1988). See Holderer, supra note 70, at 
1040. Section 2461 declares: "Whenever a civil fine, penalty or pecuniary forfeiture is pre-
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ently from other agencies by exempting its administrative actions 
from section 2462. 
CONCLUSION 
The judicial and legislative history of section 2462 of title 28 
demonstrates that the time bar protects defendants from stale 
claims asserted by the SEC. Furthermore, an interest in conducting 
fair trials also supports applying section 2462 to enforcement suits. 
As time passes, the ability to find witnesses decreases, and those 
that can be located are less likely to recall the events with great 
lucidity. Moreover, stability and predictability are served by having 
statutes of limitations. These interests are particularly important in 
economic transactions,86 a world impacted by the securities laws. If 
SEC enforcement suits could impose staggering fines on corporate 
entities at any time, the transaction costs of contracting would in-
crease as parties would have to compensate for this risk of liability. 
This inefficiency would interfere with the functioning of the free 
market and can be avoided by the imposition of statutes of 
limitation. 
scribed for the violation of an Act of Congress without specifying the mode of recovery or 
enforcement thereof, it may be recovered in a civil action." 28 U.S.C. § 2461 (1988). Be-
cause the securities laws do state a "mode of recovery or enforcement," § 2461 does not 
prevent § 2462 from controlling SEC-initiated suits for civil penalties. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78u-1 to 78u-2 (1994); see also Holderer, supra note 70, at 1040 (arguing that § 2461 does 
not control § 2462's meaning because the Toxic Control Substances Act does indicate which 
tribunal should hear suits under the Act). 
86. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 79-80, 587-88 (4th ed. 1992). 
